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INVADING THE REALM OF THE DEAD+:
EXPLORING THE (IM)PROPRIETY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARDS AGAINST ESTATES
Emily Himes Iversen*
Punitive damages are traditionally understood, at least in part, as damages de-
signed to punish. It should therefore come as no surprise that, in the majority of
states that have decided the issue, courts have chosen not to allow punitive damage
awards against the estates of deceased tortfeasors. After all, the tortfeasor can no
longer be punished (at least by tort awards). Nonetheless, punitive damages can
also serve other purposes, such as deterrence. This Note argues that Michigan, a
state which has not yet taken a stance, should adopt the minority position that
allows punitive damages to be awarded against estates. Because of Michigan’s
historically liberal stance on the survival of actions and its unique understanding
of punitive damage awards, this Note contends that the minority position is the
only position consistent with state law. However, this Note also advocates for legis-
lative action in order to make Michigan’s adoption of the minority position
absolutely clear. Such clarity would promote stability and predictability for plain-
tiffs and defendants alike and would ensure results consistent with Michigan’s
broader history and policies.
INTRODUCTION
Death belongs to God alone. By what right do men touch
that unknown thing?1
When G.J.D. ended her five-year relationship with Darwin
Thebes, she may have expected that he would be upset.2 She may
even have expected that he would try to win her back. But one
thing she likely did not anticipate was that Thebes had been keep-
ing two secret photographs of G.J.D.—photographs that depicted
her partially nude and performing fellatio, respectively.3 G.J.D. had
+ This title is drawn from Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891) (“[T]he realm
of the dead is not invaded, and punishment visited upon the dead.”), overruled by Glaskox ex
rel. Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992). For more context for this quotation, see
infra Part I.A.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, May 2014.
1. VICTOR HUGO, LES MISE´RABLES, 23 (1887).
2. G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Pa. 1998).
3. Id. While the particular photographs at issue in this case were kept hidden from
G.J.D. for years before their distribution, Thebes’s actions in this case were not entirely out of
character. The Court notes that “[t]he dissemination of the materials followed a pattern of
behavior whereby Thebes, while residing with G.J.D., physically and psychologically abused
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not seen these photographs until they began to emerge all over her
community.4 The photographs, labeled with her contact informa-
tion and “captions which implied that she was a prostitute,” were
distributed in a malicious, calculated manner.5 Thebes carefully
planned his distributions so that the photographs would be found
by G.J.D.’s family and friends, including her employer and her two
minor children.6 Thebes stopped posting the photographs only af-
ter G.J.D. filed suit against him alleging defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy, and
invasion of privacy by publicity given to private life.7
While the facts alleged by G.J.D were sensational, her request for
punitive damages might have been rather straightforward had
Thebes not committed suicide before trial.8 After Thebes’s suicide,
the executrix of his estate was substituted as defendant.9 A jury
awarded G.J.D. and her children a combined $76,500 in punitive
damages, but the executrix successfully appealed the damage award
all the way to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.10 Pennsylvania ulti-
mately upheld G.J.D.’s punitive damage award, but it joined a
distinct minority of states in doing so.11 At that time, fourteen states
had legislation explicitly preventing the recovery of punitive dam-
ages against estates, and another fourteen had reached the same
conclusion judicially.12 By contrast, Pennsylvania became only the
sixth state at that time to allow such a recovery.13 As of 2011, the
number of states allowing such a recovery (“minority jurisdiction”
states) had increased to ten, but the number of states prohibiting
such a recovery (“majority jurisdiction” states) had held steady at
her and her children.” Id. at 1131. Thebes’s distribution of the photographs to G.J.D.’s em-
ployer could be characterized as an extension of this pattern into economic abuse (the
practice of “controlling and limiting the victim’s access to financial resources, [such that] a
batterer ensures that the victim will be financially limited if he/she chooses to leave the
relationship.”). NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ECONOMIC ABUSE, available at
http://www.ncadv.org/files/EconomicAbuse.pdf.
4. G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1128.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. G.J.D.’s son and daughter, both minors, were also plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Id.
8. Id. While cases involving punitive damages claimed against an estate can involve the
death of the tortfeasor by suicide or natural causes, many cases involve the death of the
defendant from the tortious conduct itself. For example, Shirley v. Shirley, 73 So.2d 77, 79
(Ala. 1954), involved the death of the defendant in the car accident at issue in the case.
9. G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1128. The executrix of Thebes’s estate was his sister, Geraldine
Johnson. Id.
10. Id. at 1128–29 & n.2. The plaintiffs were also awarded $21,015 in compensatory dam-
ages, which was not appealed. Id.
11. Id. at 1130.
12. Id. at 1129 & n.3.
13. Id. at 1129–30.
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twenty-eight,14 making it difficult to discern any trend toward either
outcome.15
Michigan has not officially adopted a position on the survival of
punitive damages, but there is only one solution that is fully consis-
tent with its laws in other areas. This Note argues that Michigan
courts must adopt the minority position as a result of the State’s
broadly-worded survival statute,16 history of allowing the liberal sur-
vival of damages, and unique approach to punitive damages. While
courts would be obliged to adopt the minority position under the
current legal framework, this Note argues that the legislature
should act affirmatively in order to make the position of the State
absolutely clear.
It is not superfluous to ask the legislature to clarify the issue.
First, the divide between jurisdictions regarding the recovery of pu-
nitive damages against an estate is not merely a technical one.
Rather, it reflects disagreements about principles that reach the
very heart of tort law: the goals of damage awards in general, the
effectiveness and relative importance of deterrence, and the mean-
ing of compensation.17 Michigan’s stance on this issue has the
potential to either illuminate or hopelessly confuse the State’s posi-
tion on central issues of tort jurisprudence. Second, the issue is
likely to create confusion in the lower courts. Because the proper
position for Michigan largely depends on factors unique to the
state, it would be easy for some courts to be led astray by the logic of
the majority position, which might well lay out the best solution for
other states. Furthermore, any inconsistency in the lower courts has
the potential to damage their perceived legitimacy. Punitive dam-
age awards can be extremely large.18 If neighboring courts disagree
on whether such damages could survive the death of a defendant,
an extraordinary sum of money might hinge on the town that a
plaintiff happened to live in or the judge that a plaintiff happened
to be assigned. This has the potential to create a sense of perceived
14. This count includes the District of Columbia. See infra note 15.
15. See Timothy R. Robicheaux & Brian R. Bornstein, Punished, Dead or Alive: Empirical
Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased Defendants, 16 PSYCHOLOGY, PUB.
POL’Y, AND L. 393 (2010); see also G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1129. See the Appendix for a complete
description of this Note’s categorization of jurisdictions adopting the majority and minority
approaches.
16. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2921 (2004).
17. See infra Part I.A–B.
18. See Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke From Phillip Morris v. Williams: the Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 397–400 (2008) (explaining that
multimillion-dollar punitive damage awards were “commonplace” before Phillip Morris v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007), but that such extremely large awards may be less common
now).
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injustice. By making the state’s position on the topic absolutely
clear, the Michigan legislature can avoid such problematic inconsis-
tencies and, more importantly, ensure that all future decisions on
the subject are consistent with Michigan’s unique laws and history.
Part I begins by exploring the decisions of other states. It shows
that majority-jurisdiction and minority-jurisdiction states differ pri-
marily in their perception of the purposes and effectiveness of
punitive damages. Part II first explains Michigan’s unique viewpoint
on the justification of punitive damages. In particular, it notes that
Michigan disfavors traditional “punitive” damages but, in many of
the situations in which other states award punitive damages, instead
awards compensatory “exemplary damages.” Part II then discusses
Michigan’s broadly worded survival statute and its history of al-
lowing causes of action to survive the death of a defendant
unchanged. Part III argues that Michigan’s unique approach to pu-
nitive damages shows that the minority position is not only sound
policy, but that Michigan’s survival statute actually requires its adop-
tion. This Note concludes that, although there is a legitimate
national debate regarding punitive damage awards against estates,
such a policy debate is more appropriately held in the legislature
than in the courts, and that Michigan’s legislature should adopt the
minority position.
I. THE SURVIVAL OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN OTHER STATES
Majority-jurisdiction and minority-jurisdiction states differ prima-
rily in the way they characterize the purposes of punitive damages.
Majority-jurisdiction states tend to emphasize the importance of
punishment. To the extent that they view deterrence as an impor-
tant goal of punitive damages, they view punitive damages against
an estate as ineffective at deterring similarly-situated, living
tortfeasors.19 Minority-jurisdiction states, on the other hand, tend to
view deterrence as a central goal of tort awards and believe that
punitive damages against estates are effective in furthering that
goal.20
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part I.B and notes 30–39.
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A. Majority-Jurisdiction Reasoning
Majority-jurisdiction states generally view punishment as one of
the most important goals of awarding punitive damages.21 If the of-
fender is dead, further earthly punishment is impossible, and
punitive damages are not warranted. The Mississippi Supreme
Court eloquently summarized this perspective:
Our statutes have modified the common law to the extent of
permitting a recovery against the representative of the de-
ceased wrong-doer to an amount sufficient to compensate for
the actual damage sustained by the injured party; but the
realm of the dead is not invaded, and punishment visited
upon the dead.22
Not only is it impossible to punish the dead, but allowing even a
pecuniary punishment to fall upon the innocent may be contrary to
the underlying goals of punishment.23 Under a retributive theory of
punishment, levying punitive damages against innocent parties is
inherently disturbing.24 As much as the law might want to reach
into the grave, punishing the estate of a dead man cannot “balance
the scales,” or satisfy our sense that those who have committed
moral wrongs should be punished. Even the appearance of having
punished the wrong party could be harmful to the perceived legiti-
macy of a state’s courts. Taken far enough, such perceived
illegitimacy could dilute the social or moral force of court
decisions.
Majority-jurisdiction states are also quick to point out that pun-
ishment is closely linked to deterrence, another central goal of
21. Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill, 981 N.E.2d 671, 684–85 (Mass. 2013); Lohr v. Byrd, 522
So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. 1988); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn.
1982); Braun v. Moreno, 466 P.2d 60, 62–63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970).
22. Hewllette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891), overruled by Glaskox ex rel. Denton v.
Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992).
23. Cf. Doe v. Colligan, 753 P.2d 144, 145 (Alaska 1988) (“Several courts take the posi-
tion that the exemplary purpose of punitive damages is not well served by imposing damages
on anyone other than the actual wrongdoer.”); Evans v. Gibson, 31 P.2d 389, 395 (Cal. 1934)
(“[P]unitive damages by way of example to others should be imposed only on actual
wrongdoers.”).
24. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, PART II (W. Hastie trans., T & T Clark
1887) (1796) (explaining Kant’s retributivist theories of punishment).
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punitive damage awards.25 If the defendant is dead, the goal of spe-
cifically deterring the wrongdoer is moot.26 Further, if one cannot
punish the wrongdoer directly, then even the general deterrent ef-
fect of the punishment becomes more speculative.27 One wonders if
men like Thebes, despite their seeming imperviousness to earthly
punishment, would be swayed by the prospect that their heirs might
be forced to pay additional damages upon their death.
Because punishment and deterrence are two central goals of pu-
nitive damage awards,28 majority jurisdiction states conclude that
awarding punitive damages against estates would either be purpose-
less or serve too attenuated a purpose to justify the imposition.29
B. Minority-Jurisdiction Reasoning
Minority-jurisdiction states—those that allow punitive damages
against estates—cite a variety of theoretical and statutory rationales
to justify their position. These states are more likely to see general,
rather than specific, deterrence as a central goal of tort theory; they
are also more likely to believe that punitive damages against an es-
tate could be effective for this purpose.30 In other words, they tend
to believe that levying a punitive damage award might deter other,
similarly-situated defendants. According to minority-jurisdiction
states, this general deterrence justifies punitive damages against es-
tates, even though the specific defendant in question can no longer
be deterred.31
In addition to believing that punitive damages continue to have
some deterrent value even after a defendant has died, minority-ju-
risdiction states may also suggest that punitive damages are valuable
for other reasons. For example, Arizona has held that punitive dam-
ages retain their inherent value as a signal of societal disapproval
25. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 761 P.2d 446, 449 (N.M. 1968);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (listing deterrence as one of the cen-
tral purposes of tort damages); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 450 (9th Ed. 2009) (defining a
deterrent as “[s]omething that impedes; something that prevents”).
26. See, e.g., Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 940 (D.C. 1995); Doe, 753
P.2d at 145–46 (Alaska 1988).
27. State Farm, 761 P.2d at 449; see also Woodner, 665 A.2d at 940.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
29. See, e.g., Woodner, 665 A.2d at 939–40 & n. 16 (noting the views of other
jurisdictions).
30. See, e.g. Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E.2d 352, 355–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Tillett v.
Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Mont. 1996).
31. See, e.g., G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 1998).
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even after the defendant has died.32 Other states view such awards
as similar to a debt of the estate, rather than as punishment of inno-
cent heirs.33 Finally, some state courts base their decisions not on
theoretical concerns but on their interpretation of specific state
statutes.34
Courts in the minority believe that the prospect of a punitive
damage award against a person’s estate may deter him from com-
mitting a dangerous tort.35 While not all minority-jurisdiction states
hold that the general deterrent effect of an award against an estate
is equally effective as an award against the tortfeasor in deterring
tortious behavior,36 many have nonetheless found that it is effective
enough to warrant such awards.37 The threat of a punitive damage
award against one’s estate may not send the same chill up one’s
spine as the threat of life after paying a large damage award, but the
incremental effect could still be intimidating enough to give one
pause. As the court in Haralson v. Fisher Surveying Inc. emphasized,
“where general deterrence, as here, is a prime factor . . . [the defen-
dant] must recognize that the decision to drive in that condition
[of intoxication] may result in placing everything on the line, even if
solely as a reminder to others so tempted.”38 This logic leads to the
straightforward conclusion articulated in Shirley v. Shirley: if “the
purpose is to prevent homicides,” then the law should authorize
32. Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 117 (Ariz. 2001) (“[W]e conclude
that there are situations in which it would be appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, to
express society’s disapproval of outrageous conduct by rendering such an award against the
estate of a deceased tortfeasor.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. See G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131.
34. See, e.g., Tillett, 909 P.2d at 1162 (interpreting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220, which
allowed “punitive damages for the sake of example” as allowing punitive damages against an
estate). The persuasiveness of any reasoning based on state statutory authority is obviously
limited outside the state in question. Nonetheless, the arguments are worth noting in light of
Michigan’s unique statutory backdrop, discussed in detail in Part II, infra.
35. See, e.g., Haralson, 31 P.3d at 117–18; G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131; Shirley v. Shirley, 73
So.2d 77, 85 (Ala. 1954).
36. The court in G.J.D. took the more extreme view that “the deterrent effect on the
conduct of others is no more speculative in [cases where the tortfeasor has died] than in
those cases where the tortfeasor is alive.” 713 A.2d at 1131.
37. See, e.g., Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E.2d 352, 356–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (authorizing
punitive damages against an estate for the sake of example to others similarly situated); Tillet,
909 P.2d at 1162.
38. Haralson, 31 P.3d at 120 (Jones, Vice C.J., specially concurring) (emphasis added).
Vice Chief Justice Jones’s opinion is also useful in that it points out the apparent inconsis-
tency in refusing to award punitive damages against an estate given that, “had [the
defendant] survived the crash with full, permanent mental disability, he would be ‘alive’ but
unable to function.” Id. If specific deterrence and punishment were the only factors motivat-
ing punitive damage awards, such a result would be absurd.
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“the fixation of a sum which will have a tendency to prevent such
homicides.”39
Just as punitive damage awards against a living defendant may
have value apart from deterrence, at least one state has argued that
there may be inherent worth in awards against the deceased.40 In
Haralson, the Arizona Supreme Court held that punitive damages in
that state exist not only to punish the defendant but also to “express
society’s disapproval of outrageous conduct.”41 The court listed “ter-
rorist attacks or bombings, mass murders, and serial killings” as
examples of situations where “the assets of those who perpetrate
such atrocities and then die” should not be protected.42 Thus, ex-
pressing societal disapproval and reinforcing social norms could
have inherent symbolic value even when the deterrent effect is
unclear.
In addition to arguing that punitive damage awards against es-
tates have value by making an example of the dead, some minority-
jurisdiction states also argue that such awards do not punish the
living. These courts point out that, because the assets of the de-
ceased will be encumbered by an award, the innocence of the
tortfeasor’s heirs is irrelevant.43 From this perspective, punitive
damages function as a debt to an involuntary creditor.44 Allowing a
tort victim to collect punitive damages against an estate is no more
problematic than permitting voluntary creditors to collect fully
against the estate, and no more unjust in its effects on the dece-
dent’s heirs.45 As the Arizona Supreme Court noted in Haralson,
39. Shirley, 73 So.2d at 85.
40. Haralson, 31 P.3d at 117. This deontological assertion of the worthiness of setting an
example closely parallels the desire for punishing living defendants in much the same way
that the consequentialist argument in favor of general deterrence parallels the role of spe-
cific deterrence.
41. Id. (quoting Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987)).
42. Id. at 117. That particular case, however, involved an intoxicated driver, suggesting
that the court contemplated awards in less extreme cases.
43. See Haralson, 31 P.3d at 118; see also, G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa.
1998) (“To allow a tortfeasor’s estate to escape payment of punitive damages would be com-
parable to the injustice of allowing a defendant to transfer his wealth to his prospective heirs
and beneficiaries prior to the trial of a case in which punitive damages are sought against
him.”)
44. This is consistent with the general practice of referring to tort victims as “involuntary
creditors,” see, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887,
1895 n.36 (1994), and with the treatment of punitive damages as a form of debt when an
action is brought against an “innocent” successor corporation after a merger. See, e.g., Joel
Slawotsky, The Impropriety of Levying Punitive Damages on Innocent Successor Corporations, 38 DUQ.
L. REV. 49, 52 n.28 (1999). In both cases, treating the tort victim as an involuntary creditor
suggests that the victim should be allowed to recover against the defendant’s assets, even if
those assets would otherwise be transferred to an innocent party. But cf. id. (arguing that
punitive damages should not be levied against innocent successor corporations).
45. G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131.
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“The tortfeasor’s estate is entitled only to what the law affords—
nothing more. Whatever the heirs may hope to inherit is generally
contingent upon the obligations incurred by the deceased during
his or her lifetime.”46 To the extent that this fear of harming “inno-
cent” heirs is part and parcel of a larger fear of unjust awards, the
jury, if properly instructed on the death of the defendant, should
act as a check on improper awards, just as it does with living
defendants.47
Finally, some minority-jurisdiction courts draw on their own
states’ survival statutes to determine whether or not punitive dam-
ages are properly awarded against estates. The conclusions that
courts have drawn from these statutes are as diverse as the statutes
themselves. Illinois interpreted its survival statute to allow the con-
tinuation of punitive damage actions against estates based on
statutory claims or certain equitable circumstances but not on com-
mon law.48 Montana interpreted its statutes regarding punitive
damages and the survival of actions to allow punitive damages to
survive the death of the tortfeasor in all cases.49 Arizona, on the
other hand, used its lack of a statute to conclude that there was no
reason to believe that punitive damages should be extinguished by
the death of a tortfeasor.50 While the interpretations of these partic-
ular statutes shed little light on the issue of punitive damages more
generally, they give good reason to believe that Michigan’s survival
statute, in conjunction with its established stance on punitive dam-
ages, would be paramount in finding a solution suited to the state.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND MICHIGAN’S SURVIVAL STATUTE
Michigan law regarding punitive damages is unique in two rele-
vant respects. First, while Michigan courts have historically upheld
46. Haralson, 31 P.3d at 118.
47. G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131; Haralson, 31 P.3d at 119. For an empirical study of the effect
of defendant death on jury awards, see generally Robicheaux & Bornstein, supra note 15, at
415. The study found that the injury or death of a defendant did not significantly affect the
level of punitive damages awarded by mock juries. Id. This could mean that juries are unre-
sponsive to instructions on the death of a defendant or fail to understand the differences
between specific and general deterrence. Alternatively, it could simply mean that juries place
a high value on general deterrence rather than on specific deterrence, in which case award-
ing punitive damages after the death of a defendant would simply be more in line with the
typical citizen’s values. Note also that the respect for juries in American jurisprudence may be
based on other values than their effectiveness as an empirical matter.
48. See, e.g., Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
49. Montana has an extremely liberal punitive damages statute. See Tillet v. Lippert, 909
P.2d 1158, 1162 (Mont. 1996).
50. Haralson, 31 P.3d at 118.
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awards of “punitive” or, more commonly, “exemplary” damages in a
manner functionally equivalent to other states’ punitive damages,
the Michigan Supreme Court has held that such damages must be
compensatory in nature.51 Second, the survival of causes of action
in Michigan has historically been determined by a relatively liberal
survival statute, rather than by the common law.52 Any argument
about the possible survival of exemplary damages must account for
this history. The majority-jurisdiction solution therefore appears en-
tirely ill-suited to Michigan law.53
A. Exemplary Damages in Michigan
In most states, punitive damages are understood to be “damages,
other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others like him from similar conduct in the future.”54 While
there is debate about both the degree to which punitive damages
are designed to punish rather than deter and under what condi-
tions such damages have maximum deterrent effect, most states
accept that deterrence and punishment are the general goals of pu-
nitive damages.55
Michigan courts award nominally “punitive” damages only when
expressly authorized by statute56 and almost never in the sense used
by the Restatement and majority-jurisdiction states. That is, Michi-
gan disfavors damage awards explicitly designed to punish.57
51. See infra Part II.A. Michigan sometimes labels these damages as “punitive,” despite
noting that they are not punitive in nature. Unless otherwise specified, this Note will use the
term “exemplary damages” to refer to punitive damages as they are understood in Michigan
case law, regardless of how they are labeled, and “punitive damages” to refer to punitive
damages as they are commonly understood.
52. See infra Part II.B.
53. See infra Part IV.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). The rationale adopted by the Re-
statement reflects the doctrine in many states. For more information on majority-jurisdiction
states adopting this rationale, see infra Part IV, which contrasts majority-jurisdiction supreme
court cases adopting this rationale with the law of Michigan.
55. For a sampling of the views of state courts, see supra Part I. For a useful discussion of
the purposes of punitive damages from a more scholarly standpoint, see, for example, Keith
N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 421–22
(1998) (discussing the debate regarding whether punitive damages should aim for “complete
deterrence” by eliminating the morally disfavored gain of the average offender, or “optimal
deterrence,” forcing the defendant to internalize the costs of his action only to the degree
that doing so benefits society at large).
56. Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 400 (Mich. 2004).
57. LORI S. NUGENT & ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:50 (2011 ed.).
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However, “exemplary” damages, which are purportedly compensa-
tory in nature, are available in many of the same situations in which
other states award punitive damages.58 Rather than aiming to pun-
ish or deter the defendant, however, exemplary damages in
Michigan instead compensate the plaintiff for the increased injury
to his or her feelings caused by malicious, willful, and wanton con-
duct.59 As Justice Wiest famously illustrated in Wise v. Daniel:
If a cow kicks a man in the face the consequent physical hurt
may equal that from a kick in the face with a hob-nailed boot,
but the ‘cussedness’ of the cow raises no sense of outrage,
while the malicious motive back of the boot kick adds materi-
ally to the victim’s sense of outrage. If a man employs spite and
venom in administering a physical hurt, he must not expect
his maliciousness to escape consideration when he is cast to
make compensation for his wrong.60
Justice Wiest might have said, in plainer terms, simply that context
matters when calculating how to compensate an injured person. A
farm employee who gets kicked while milking cows might be em-
barrassed, and might even require stitches, but he would not have
his view of the world or his place within it fundamentally shaken.
Someone who is pushed to the ground in a public square and has
her face stomped on, however, would face an injury far greater than
the number of stitches required. She might feel humiliated, out-
raged, and helpless. Her sense of security in the world might be
deeply shaken. Even if she faced exactly the same physical injury as
the farm employee, she would face additional psychological dam-
age which is not readily measurable.
In Michigan, actual damages compensate for the sort of injuries
that may as well have been caused by the kick of a cow, while exem-
plary damages compensate the plaintiff for the “incremental injury
to feelings attributable to the sense of indignation and outrage”
that might reasonably accompany a particularly outrageous or mali-
cious attack.61 For this reason, both actual damages and exemplary
damages may be awarded without being duplicative.62
58. Id.; see also, e.g., Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Mich.
1984); 7 MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE Damages §§ 161–62 (2009).
59. 7 MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE Damages §§ 161–62 (2009).
60. Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (Mich. 1922).
61. Id.
62. Id. Some cases have held that exemplary damages are inappropriate in situations
where the extent of the injury is capable of exact calculation. 7 MICHIGAN CIVIL JURISPRU-
DENCE Damages § 162 (2009). This might provide an alternative ground for distinguishing
between actual damages, awarded where the injury to a plaintiffs feelings is calculable, and
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Michigan therefore awards exemplary damages much like other
states award punitive damages. That is, Michigan awards such dam-
ages only in cases in which the defendant has acted in a particularly
reprehensible manner and gives the jury considerable latitude in
assessing these recondite damages.63 Unlike other states, however,
Michigan views these damages not as punishment to the defendant,
but rather as additional compensation to the plaintiff for the incre-
mental increase in injury caused by intentional, egregious conduct.
For example, one might imagine that G.J.D. and her children
would suffer humiliation and outrage beyond that normally attrib-
uted to the distribution of such a photograph due to the egregious
nature of the malicious distribution of secret photographs with the
intent of shocking the children.64
While Michigan’s unique approach to exemplary damages does
not fit neatly into either the minority-jurisdiction or majority-juris-
diction framework, it seems most logically consistent with the
former.65 If Michigan truly views exemplary damages as a form of
compensation, rather than punishment, it seems illogical to tie
such damages to the life of the defendant. Even if the Michigan
Supreme Court decides to deviate from its traditional approach to
exemplary damages on practical grounds, it will have to operate
within (or give good reason for deviating from) the framework cre-
ated by Justice Wiest.
B. Michigan’s Survival Statute and Wrongful Death Act
Just as Michigan’s approach to exemplary damages differs from
other states’ views of punitive damages, so too does its approach to
the survival of damages and causes of action following the death of
either party. The Michigan Survival Statute, Michigan Compiled
Laws (MCL) section 600.2921, is a short yet sweeping statement
that “[a]ll actions and claims survive death.”66 Michigan courts have
made clear that this provision applies both to the death of the
exemplary damages for feelings of “rage” or “humiliation,” which may not be readily
quantified.
63. See NUGENT & HAMMESFAHR, supra note 57.
64. See G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Pa. 1998); discussion supra Part I. Note
that, in Michigan, G.J.D. and her children might have been awarded both damages for the
emotional damages that would naturally follow from the distribution of such a photograph,
as well as exemplary damages for the additional injury caused by the egregious nature of the
intentional distribution and pattern of abuse.
65. This argument will be discussed further infra Part IV.
66. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2921 (2004).
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plaintiff and to the death of the defendant.67 The Survival Statute is
often read in conjunction with Michigan’s Wrongful Death Act,
MCL section 600.2922, which elaborates on damages in the case of
the death of the plaintiff.68
Because no sections of the code separate these two distinct provi-
sions, case law surrounding the statute can easily be misread. While
MCL sections 600.2921 and 600.2922 speak explicitly to the award
of appropriate damages in the event of the death of the plaintiff,
both sections are entirely silent as to the award of damages follow-
ing the death of the defendant. Nonetheless, case law interpreting
the Survival Statute, which applies to the death of either party, fre-
quently involves the interpretation of both the Survival Statute and
the Wrongful Death Act.69 For this reason, understanding the
Wrongful Death Act may help to elucidate the meaning of the  Sur-
vival Statute.
Michigan designed and amended both statutes to abrogate a sig-
nificant body of common law, and the statutory history supports a
broad reading of the statute’s purpose.70 Under the common law,
all causes of action were extinguished at the death of either party.71
In the early nineteenth century, Michigan’s legislature passed two
separate statutes to address the survival of actions upon a party’s
death.72 The first, the Wrongful Death Act (WDA) provided a cause
of action in the limited set of circumstances where a plaintiff was
killed by a defendant’s tortious conduct.73 The Survival Statute, in
contrast, did not create a new cause of action but instead preserved
certain actions beyond the death of one of the parties.74 The result
67. The death of the defendant does not bar recovery, and actions can proceed against
the representatives of the estate. 1A MICH. PLEADING & PRACTICE § 12:6 (2d ed. 2006); MICH.
CT. R. 2.202(A) (providing for the substitution of parties in the event of the death of either
party).
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922 (2004).
69. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2921 (2004) (referring to “the next section,” Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.2922 (2004)); see also, e.g., Jenkins v. Patel, 684 N.W.2d 346, 356 (Mich.
2004); McNitt v. Citco Drilling Co., 230 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
70. See Hawkins v. Reg’l Med. Lab., P.C., 329 N.W.2d 729, 731–34 (Mich. 1982) (detail-
ing the statute’s history, including the significant body of common law it abrogated).
71. At common law, causes of action did not survive the death of the plaintiff and no
cause of action accrued to the family. Bowen E. Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and
Survival Statutes, 23 MICH. L. REV. 114, 114 (1924). A trend towards allowing claims to survive
by abrogating the common law statutorily began in the United States after England passed an
early survival statute, Lord Campbell’s Act, in 1846. Id. at 115.
72. Hawkins, 329 N.W.2d at 731.
73. Id. at 731–32.
74. Id. In 1939, both acts were amended to form what are now MCL sections 600.2921
and 600.2922. Act No. 297, 1939 Mich. Pub. Acts 687 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 600.2922, 2921). This act was technically an amendment to the Wrongful Death Act
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is that courts read causes of action to survive the death of the defen-
dant under what is now MCL section 600.2921, while reading the
current MCL section 600.2922 to provide certain benefits to the es-
tates of plaintiffs who were killed as a result of tortious conduct,
including additional damages and a stay of the statute of
limitations.75
While Michigan’s jurisprudence surrounding the death of a
plaintiff is not directly relevant to the question at hand, it is useful
in understanding the Survival Statute as it relates to punitive dam-
ages. MCL sections 600.2921 and 600.2922 are closely connected
not only by their history but also by a series of internal cross-refer-
ences. MCL section 600.2921 explicitly provides that, in the event of
the death of a plaintiff, a failure to properly amend a claim under
MCL section 600.2922 may amount to a waiver of certain damages.
For this reason, MCL section 600.2921 is often read in pari materia
with MCL section 600.2922.76
While the Michigan Supreme Court has referred to the Wrongful
Death Act as creating a “filter,”77 the logic of MCL sections 600.2921
and 600.2922 suggests that the term “pipeline” might be more ap-
propriate. The so-called “filter” removes nothing, and may in fact
add additional damages. The Michigan Supreme Court has held
that “[t]he mere fact that our legislative scheme requires that suits
for tortious conduct resulting in death be filtered through the so-
called ‘death-act,’ MCL section 600.2922, MSA 27A.2922, does not
change the character of such actions except to expand the elements of
damage available.”78 Causes of action thus survive the “filter” almost
entirely unchanged. For example, Michigan courts have held that
statutory caps on medical malpractice claims survive the death of
the plaintiff, because the malpractice suit maintains its character as
a malpractice suit even after the plaintiff’s death.79 Likewise, a claim
that repealed inconsistent provisions of the Survival Statute. Courts, however, later deter-
mined that those portions of the Survival Statute that were consistent with the new statute
continued to be valid, and “[i]t cannot be doubted that causes of action continue to survive.”
See Hawkins, 329 N.W.2d at732–34. The amendments actually made few substantive changes,
except to clarify that causes of action for wrongful death were to be brought under the WDA
instead of the Survival Statute. Id.
75. Hawkins, 329 N.W.2d at 735–36.
76. See supra note 69.
77. Hawkins, 329 N.W.2d at 735.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Jenkins v. Patel, 684 N.W.2d 346, 350–51 (Mich. 2004) (noting that “a wrongful
death action grounded in medical malpractice is a medical malpractice action” for the pur-
poses of applying a statutory noneconomic damages cap).
SPRING 2014] Punitive Damage Awards Against Estates 841
in a civil suit to exclude a defendant’s illegally obtained blood sam-
ple, although personal to the defendant, survived his death.80
The Survival Statute thus provides a pipeline through which
causes of action ordinarily pass unchanged, save for the possible
addition of some damages in the event of the death of the plain-
tiff.81 Michigan courts have been unequivocal that “the statutory
language leads to the inescapable conclusion that the intervention
of death neither limits nor precludes the type of damages that
could have been recovered by the person.”82
If Michigan’s Supreme Court were to adopt the majority rule and
hold that exemplary damage claims do not survive the death of the
defendant, it would be deviating from its normal practice of al-
lowing causes of action to pass unchanged through the pipeline
created by MCL section 600.2921. There is no basis for such a dif-
ferentiation in the plain language of the statute, which, after stating
that “all actions and claims survive death,” goes on to address only
the death of the plaintiff in detail. The plain meaning of this short,
simple statement is that a claim should pass through the statute’s
pipeline without any change to the damages available, regardless of
the identity of the deceased party. Indeed, the fact that the statute
goes on to elaborate on the availability of additional damages fol-
lowing the death of certain plaintiffs suggests that, had the
legislature intended to adjust the damages available in other situa-
tions, it would have done so. Further, the utility of any policy
rationale or gesture toward the common law would be limited by
80. McNitt v. Citco Drilling Co., 230 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (“[T]he
personal representative of a deceased who asserts a cause of action on behalf of a deceased
stands in the deceased’s place for all purposes incident to the enforcement of that claim, including
rights and privileges personal to the deceased in his lifetime.”).
81. See, e.g., Wesche v. Mecosta Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 746 N.W.2d 847 (Mich. 2008); Hardy
v. Maxheimer, 416 N.W.2d 299, 306 (Mich. 1987) (holding that the language of section
600.2921 is “sweeping and unambiguous” and that the wrongful death act does not create a
cause of action, but merely permits causes of action to “survive by law” and allows additional
damages).
It is true that MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922, authorizes only the recovery of “reasonable
medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses for which the estate is liable; reasonable com-
pensation for pain and suffering . . . undergone by the deceased . . . and damages for the loss
of financial support and the loss of society and companionship of the deceased.” Id. (empha-
sis added). It is also true that this may be interpreted as limiting the damages created by the
act to compensatory damages only. See French v. Mitchell, 140 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. 1966).
However, these provisions apply only to the additional damages authorized by the act. If
noncompensatory damages were authorized by the underlying cause of action, the language
qualifying those provisions would not limit the survivability of previously authorized damages in
the event of the death of the defendant. See Thorn v. Mercy Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 761 N.W.2d
414, 423 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he damages listed in § 600.2922(6) cannot be construed
as exhaustive.”).
82. Thorn, 761 N.W.2d at 424.
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Michigan’s unique approach to exemplary damages. Part III will as-
sess the reasoning used by both majority- and minority-jurisdiction
courts in light of Michigan’s unique history.
III. MICHIGAN IS FORECLOSED FROM ADOPTING THE MAJORITY
POSITION BOTH BY STATUTE AND BY POLICY
As Part I.A demonstrated, many states have declined to award
punitive damages against estates precisely because the primary pur-
pose of such damages—punishment—has been negated. Persuasive
though this argument may be in Mississippi, Alaska, or New York, it
is entirely ill-suited to Michigan. The policy rationale underlying
the majority position relies in large part on the majority’s under-
standing of punitive damages as punishment, a view not shared by
Michigan courts.83
Even if the majority’s reasoning was persuasive for Michigan
courts, the Survival Statute and Wrongful Death Act do not provide
any mechanism for disallowing damages after the death of a defen-
dant if such damages would have been permitted had the
defendant survived.84 In fact, interpreting either statute to disallow
exemplary damages against estates would require overturning a sig-
nificant body of precedent that interprets the statutes as a pipeline
through which causes of action pass unchanged.85 As such, there
are two alternative grounds, each sufficient on its own, for conclud-
ing that the majority position is unsuited to the state of Michigan.
A. The Majority Position is Inappropriate for Michigan as a Matter
of Policy
While majority-jurisdiction states generally view punishment as
one of the central goals of punitive damages,86 Michigan views ex-
emplary damages as special compensation for the incremental
damages caused by a particularly malicious crime.87 As a policy mat-
ter, this makes the majority position less appealing in Michigan.
83. See supra Part II.A.
84. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.2921–2922 (2004).
85. See supra Part II.B.
86. See, e.g., Kraft Power Corp. v. Merill, 981 N.E.2d 671, 679 (Mass. 2013); Lohr v. Byrd,
522 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. 1988); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W. 2d 400, 409 (Minn.
1982); Braun v. Moreno, 466 P.2d 60, 62–63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970).
87. See, e.g., Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747–48 (Mich. 1922); Peisner v. Detroit Free
Press, Inc., 364 N.W. 2d 600, 601 (Mich. 1984).
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Because Michigan’s exemplary damages law focuses on the harm
to the plaintiff rather than the wrong by the defendant, Michigan’s
rationale for awarding such damages survives the death of the de-
fendant entirely unchanged.88 Even among minority jurisdictions,
this is rare. Most minority jurisdictions acknowledge that, while it is
no longer possible to punish a tortfeasor, “the death of the
tortfeasor does not completely thwart the purposes underlying the
award of punitive damages.”89 While general deterrence might pro-
vide sufficient grounds for allowing punitive damages to survive in
the eyes of some courts, no other state has the additional focus on
the plaintiff which allows the rationale for such damages to survive
the death of a defendant completely.90 In Michigan’s case, it is not
that the death of the tortfeasor fails to entirely undermine the pur-
poses of punitive damages, but rather that—because exemplary and
punitive damages in Michigan are designed to compensate rather
than to punish91—it does not undermine their purposes at all.
Adopting the minority position could offer additional benefits to
Michigan. First, it would avoid the inconsistency of citing principles
of compensation and deterrence when allowing exemplary damage
awards against living defendants but characterizing those damages
as “punishment” when ruling on the availability of such awards
against estates. Adopting the majority position would imply agree-
ment with its rationale, yet that rationale is rooted in the belief that
punitive damages are designed to punish, making it futile to award
such damages after death.92 A court applying the majority position
would therefore have to conclude that punitive damages are a form
of punishment; this position would be fundamentally at odds with
Michigan’s present position, which characterizes exemplary dam-
ages as compensation.93 To therefore hold that such damages are
designed solely to punish—but only when awarded against es-
tates—would be a strange position indeed. Such inconsistency
could damage the reputation of the judiciary.
At first glance, it might appear that awarding punitive damages
against estates would produce inconsistencies by contradicting
Michigan’s restrictive policy of allowing punitive damages only
when specifically authorized by statute, but this is not the case.94 In
88. See supra Part II.B.
89. G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 1998) (emphasis added); see also, e.g.,
Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 117 (Ariz. 2001).
90. See supra Part I.B.
91. See supra Part I.A.
92. See supra Part I.A.
93. See supra Part II.B.
94. See NUGENT & HAMMESFAHR, supra note 57.
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the context of survival of claims, the question is not whether to au-
thorize damages not contemplated by the legislature, but whether
to extinguish, based on the death of the defendant, damages that
the legislature did expressly authorize against a living defendant.
Even if the law allowed exemplary damages against estates, Michi-
gan could continue to apply a policy disfavoring such damages in
most circumstances and apply a unique rationale when those dam-
ages are awarded. Adopting the minority position would not
change Michigan’s restrictive approach to exemplary damages gen-
erally but would ensure that it was applied consistently.
Predictability within the judicial system does more than promote
feelings of fairness among litigants. It also allows social actors to
structure their behaviors, lawyers to assess incoming cases, and liti-
gants to assess their options, including settlement. The majority
position would reduce predictability by tying possible damage
awards not to the behavior of the defendant or the choices of the
litigants, but to the status of the defendant as alive or dead. This
may decrease not only deterrence but also the effectiveness of
plaintiffs and their attorneys, who may not be privy to information
regarding the defendant’s health.
B. The Majority Position is Precluded by Michigan’s Survival Statute
Even if Michigan’s courts did wish to adopt the majority ap-
proach, doing so would be inconsistent with the Wrongful Death
Act and the Survival Statute as the courts have traditionally inter-
preted them. As discussed in Part II.B, Michigan courts have treated
the WDA and the Survival Statute as a pipeline through which
causes of action pass relatively unchanged. As one court put it:
The WDA acts as a ‘filter’ through which the underlying claim
proceeds. Thus, any statutory limitations on the underlying
claim apply to the wrongful death action . . . . At the same
time, damages that would have been available in the underlying ac-
tion must be recognized in the wrongful-death claim.95
Although many of the cases involved only the death of the plaintiff,
courts have interpreted the Survival Statute, MCL section 600.2921,
which applies to the death of either party.96
95. Jago v. Dep’t of State Police, No. 297880, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 1430, at *12
(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2011) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Thorn v.
Mercy Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 761 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
96. See supra Part II.B.
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There is no logical reason to believe that the legislature intended
its clear statement that “all actions and claims survive death” to ap-
ply differently to plaintiffs and defendants. Adopting the majority
position by disallowing punitive damages against estates would thus
lead to inconsistency and confusion regarding the proper applica-
tion of the Survival Statute.
It is true adopting the minority position would mean that—be-
cause of the additional damages available under MCL section
600.2922 and the broad survival of actions under MCL section
600.2921—Michigan would allow the modification of damages after
the death of a plaintiff, but not after the death of a defendant.97
While differential treatment in this respect may seem anomalous, it
is unlikely to lead to over-deterrence. Allowing damages to be in-
creased in the event that a plaintiff dies merely reflects the fact that
an additional undesirable consequence has resulted from the de-
fendant’s conduct and holds the defendant responsible for that
consequence. But the death of the defendant does not similarly
change the external circumstances, as it in no way mitigates the
plaintiff’s damages. Additionally, to the extent that exemplary dam-
ages awarded against an estate can deter a potential tortfeasor, that
deterrence is desirable, and awarding increased damages in the
event of the death of the plaintiff simply recognizes society’s in-
creased interest in deterring torts where those torts are likely to
lead to a person’s death. It is not absurd to suggest that the Michi-
gan legislature intended to allow damages to survive the death of a
defendant and also to permit additional damages upon the death
of the plaintiff.
If the majority position were so clearly correct that to adopt the
minority approach would lead to absurdity, it might be possible for
the courts to infer that the legislature intended to allow an excep-
tion to the survival of actions into its general statutory language.
Likewise, if the statute did not clearly abrogate the common law
practice of terminating all actions upon the death of either party,
one could imagine that the Michigan Supreme Court might hesi-
tate to infer an abrogation of that aspect of the common law. In this
case, however, there is significant controversy over the correct pol-
icy approach, and the majority-jurisdiction approach is less
compatible with Michigan law. For these reasons, it would be inap-
propriate to infer that the legislature intended the two situations
addressed by the first sentence of MCL 600.2921 to be treated dif-
ferently.  Similarly, the survival of every action, including the
97. See supra Part II.B.
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survival of every other type of damages, has been read into the stat-
ute. There is no reason to believe that the legislature intended this
type of damages to be treated differently than the rest.
Adopting the majority position would require Michigan courts to
apply a single blanket statement differently for plaintiffs than de-
fendants, as well as to exemplary damages and every other type of
damage available. Such different treatment would be contrary to
Michigan law.
C. Any Alternative Solution Should be Statutory
There is implicit evidence that the legislature intended the Mich-
igan courts to adopt the minority position. MCL section 600.2922
begins with the far-reaching statement that “all actions and claims
survive death.” It then proceeds to elaborate in detail on the dam-
ages available to an estate in the event of the death of a plaintiff,
while remaining completely silent as to the death of the defendant.
This suggests that the legislature believed that the general state-
ment that “all actions and claims survive death” was sufficiently
comprehensive. Nothing in that language suggests that certain
damages should survive while others should not, or that the Statute
should act as a pipeline in some cases and a filter in others. Rather,
the legislature intended all damages, including exemplary ones, to
survive the death of the defendant.
Nonetheless, the legislature should amend Michigan’s Survival
Statute, MCL section 600.2921, to make the state’s position abso-
lutely clear. Presently, the section, in its entirety, reads:
All actions and claims survive death. Actions on claims for inju-
ries which result in death shall not be prosecuted after the
death of the injured person except pursuant to the next sec-
tion. If an action is pending at the time of death the claims
may be amended to bring it under the next section. A failure
to so amend will amount to a waiver of the claim for additional
damages resulting from death.98
The italicized sentence is the only portion of the statute that ad-
dresses the death of the defendant. In contrast, the damages
available following the death of the plaintiff are further specified in
the next three sentences, as well as in the Wrongful Death Act.99
98. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2921 (2004) (emphasis added).
99. See id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922 (2004).
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Even though, as discussed in Part II.B, Michigan courts have con-
sistently interpreted the Survival Statute as a pipeline through
which causes of action pass unchanged following the death of a de-
fendant, this comparative lack of guidance creates uncertainty. The
fact that a majority of states facing the issue have adopted one posi-
tion increases the chance that a lower court may adopt the majority
position. Such a decision, however, would be inconsistent with
Michigan’s liberal approach to the survival of actions and unique
approach to punitive damages and would needlessly confuse the
state’s tort jurisprudence.
Even if Michigan wished to break with its traditions of allowing
the liberal survival of all damages and basing exemplary damage
awards on a compensatory rationale, the legislature would be better
suited than the courts to make that change. First, the legislature has
a freedom, unavailable to the courts, to tailor the statute to meet its
policy preferences. This would allow for considered debate about
the policy ramifications of allowing punitive damages to survive the
death of the defendant without the need to perform analytical
backflips to make the exception appear consistent with Michigan’s
idiosyncratic legal history. Second, adopting the majority position
would require breaking with Michigan’s lengthy, consistent policy
of allowing actions to survive the death of the defendant un-
changed. Furthermore, it would require doing so despite the fact
that punitive damages are, by definition, only awarded in the most
severe cases. Even if Michigan courts wished to limit the survival of
damages without express legislative approval, it is hard to imagine a
less sympathetic test case than that of the estate of an egregious
tortfeasor seeking protection from understandably outraged
victims.
A statute would provide the clarity and legitimacy necessary to
make a sudden restriction in the damages available in the most out-
rageous cases appear fair. Even if one believes that the majority
position would be preferable, there is good reason for the courts to
defer to the legislature in making that judgment.
CONCLUSION
While it would be inappropriate for Michigan courts to adopt any
restriction on the availability of punitive damages following the
death of a defendant, the Michigan legislature should adopt a statu-
tory amendment to remove any possible ambiguity. Michigan’s
broad Survival Statute and liberal approach to the survival of ac-
tions have traditionally allowed causes of action to pass through the
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Survival Statute unchanged. Even if a court wanted to break with
history, Michigan’s preference for treating exemplary damages as a
form of increased compensation undercuts the policy rationale for
doing so. Should a case involving the survival of exemplary damages
reach the Michigan Supreme Court before the legislature has an
opportunity to amend the statute, the Court should permit the
damages to survive. Doing so would require the Court to adopt a
minority position, but it would also recognize the plain meaning of
Michigan’s Survival Statute, history of allowing the survival of causes
of action unchanged, and unique approach to exemplary damages.
SPRING 2014] Punitive Damage Awards Against Estates 849
APPENDIX
METHODOLOGY AND INVENTORY OF STATES’ POSITIONS
Majority-Jurisdiction States
Majority-jurisdiction States are those in which punitive damage
awards are not available against the estates of deceased defendants.
A total of twenty-eight states have adopted the majority position.
Many states have done so by statute, while in other states the courts
have adopted the majority position without being given an explicit
legislative directive.
Statutory Adoption

















Thirteen other states and the District of Columbia have adopted
the majority position judicially. Robicheaux and Bornstein pro-
duced a table compiling the majority and minority status of court
100. G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1129 n.3 (Pa. 1998).
101. See also Robicheaux & Bornstein, supra note 15, at 397.
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decisions by state, level and type of court.102 For the purposes of this
Note, a state is considered to have adopted the majority position
judicially if, according to Robicheaux and Bornstein’s table, the
most recent decision from the highest state court listed in a state has
adopted the majority position and that state was not listed in G.J.D.
as a state with a survival statute that would have obligated the court
to adopt the majority position.103  This methodology includes Flor-
ida in this Note’s list of majority jurisdiction states even though
Robicheaux and Bornstein’s table shows a mixed judicial history for
that state.
The fourteen jurisdictions adopting the majority position judi-
cially are:
• Alaska














Minority-jurisdiction states allow punitive damages to be awarded
against the estates of deceased defendants. In most minority juris-
diction states, courts have adopted that position without any
explicit instructions from the legislature, although a small number
of states have adopted the position by statute.
102. See id. at 400–01.
103. See id.; see also G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1129 n.3.
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Statutory Adoption





Eight states have adopted the minority position by judicial deci-
sion. In this Note, a state is considered to have adopted the
minority position judicially if, according to Robicheaux and Born-
stein’s table, the most recent decision from the highest state court
listed in a state has adopted the minority position and that state
does not have a survival statute that would have obligated the court
to adopt the minority position.105 This methodology has led to the
inclusion of three states, Arizona, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, in this
Note’s list of minority jurisdiction states even though Robicheaux
and Bornstein’s table shows a mixed judicial history.











One state, New Hampshire, is included in Robicheaux and Born-
stein’s analysis and, under the methodology otherwise used in this
Note, would be listed as a minority-jurisdiction state.106 Despite the
104. Robicheaux & Bornstein, supra note 15, at 397.
105. See id. at 397, 400–01.
106. See id. at 401.
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decision referenced in Robicheaux and Bornstein’s analysis, how-
ever, there is “no consensus among legal scholars” as to whether
punitive damages against estates are allowed or not in New Hamp-
shire.107 Because the majority or minority status of New Hampshire
is still debated, it has been omitted from the calculations of this
Note.
107. See G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1129 n.6.
